A recent Executive Order signals a profound recalibration of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s mandate, aiming to accelerate U.S. nuclear energy deployment…
This directive revisits long-standing debates in American nuclear policy, echoing historical tensions between active industry promotion and stringent safety oversight—a theme familiar to readers of this site. Let’s dissect the order’s core points, examining its potential impacts against the backdrop of our nuclear regulatory past.
Who’s Really in Charge of the Atom?
The Executive Order (Sec 1) emphatically re-frames nuclear energy as a “vital national- and economic-security interest.” This declaration effectively broadens the NRC’s perceived “ownership” of the nuclear domain; no longer is its primary concern merely the containment of radiological risk, but now also the active achievement of strategic energy outcomes.
This approach is reminiscent of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, where national security imperatives gave the US Federal Government almost exclusive control over atomic development. The Act lodged that power in the Atomic Energy Commission. This contrasts with the NRC’s subsequent, more narrowly defined safety oversight role.
The NRC’s Revised Mission and Structure
The Executive Order fundamentally redefines the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s mission and scope. Section 3 explicitly states the NRC’s mission “shall include facilitating nuclear power while ensuring reactor safety,” compelling it to consider “benefits…to our economic and national security in addition to safety…”
To enact this, Section 4 mandates a structural reorganization, including potential staff reductions and a diminished Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, all to promote “expeditious processing.” This directive directly reverses the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act’s rationale, which, as I’ve described previously (“The Creation of the NRC”), separated the AEC’s promotional and safety functions precisely because of their inherent tension.
Can the functions be re-combined successfully?
The notion that an agency can vigorously champion an industry’s expansion while simultaneously exercising uncompromised, stringent safety oversight was already challenged 50 years ago. That’s what gave birth to the NRC.
But the White House’s argument is, essentially, that this ancient notion has failed based on the fruits of 50 years of policy:
"Between 1954 and 1978, the United States authorized the construction of 133 since-completed civilian nuclear reactors at 81 power plants. Since 1978, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has authorized only a fraction of that number; of these, only two reactors have entered into commercial operation. The NRC charges applicants by the hour to process license applications, with prolonged timelines that maximize fees while throttling nuclear power development. The NRC has failed to license new reactors even as technological advances promise to make nuclear power safer, cheaper, more adaptable, and more abundant than ever. This failure stems from a fundamental error: Instead of efficiently promoting safe, abundant nuclear energy, the NRC has instead tried to insulate Americans from the most remote risks without appropriate regard for the severe domestic and geopolitical costs of such risk aversion."
I’m optimistic this revised stewardship model will find a novel path to balancing these powerful imperatives.
18 Months to “Go Nuclear”: The EO’s Regulatory Sprint and Its Potential Hurdles
A central thrust of the Executive Order is the aggressive redrawing of regulatory boundaries to accelerate nuclear deployment.
Section 5 mandates a “wholesale revision” of NRC regulations and guidance, with ambitious fixed deadlines—notably, no more than 18 months for a final decision on new reactor construction and operation applications (Sec 5a). Expedited pathways for previously DOE/DOD-tested designs (Sec 5d) and streamlined licensing for modular and microreactors (Sec 5e) further aim to lower existing hurdles.
This contrasts sharply with the NRC’s traditionally meticulous, and often protracted, review processes. While efficiency is a laudable goal, the prospect of a “reasonably diligent applicant” (Sec 5a) navigating the entire licensing arc for any novel reactor within 18 months presents a significant challenge. Critics of this approach will likely point to the potential “reductions in force” (Sec 4a) as proof of an insurmountable challenge.
From “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” to “Credibly Realistic”
Perhaps the most fundamental (and controversial) shift ordered is in how the NRC calculates and evaluates radiological risk.
Section 1 and Section 5b directly challenge the long-standing Linear No-Threshold (LNT) model and the “as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA) principle as “flawed,” mandating a transition to “science-based radiation limits” and “determinate, data-backed thresholds” that assess “credible, realistic risks.”
This is a significant–dare I say even, a more than minimal–departure from long-term industry philosophy. The EO suggests that the perceived economic and geopolitical costs of the current conservative risk imputation outweigh the benefits of mitigating remote, or as the EO frames them, “trivial” risks.
The LNT model has long been criticized. Now that the NRC has been directed to re-evaluate its radiation protection standards, it may finally move to update them.
This will not be the first time the NRC faces this issue. It was petitioned in 2015 to reconsider. The NRC’s Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes (ACMUI) issued a report that acknowledged some basis for the challenge:
"Mechanistic studies and epidemiologic studies of background radiation and recent nuclear accidents (Fukushima and Chernobyl) suggest that LNT may not be the correct model...
...Although areas such as Yangjiang, China and Kerala, India have high natural background levels of radiation (eg up to an order of magnitude higher than the mean natural background radiation doses per capita in the United States), the incidence of cancer in such areas does not appear to be increased (13,14). Finally, data from nuclear accidents suggest that low-dose radiation does not increase the cancer risk among exposed residents."
The NRC, however, denied the petition. Perhaps the most glaring question to ask is why it took six years for them to issue a conclusion?
The NRC declined to seriously consider the matter on its own when it had the opportunity, perhaps because its primary mission focus on safety screened out reasonable alternatives. It could have proposed new regulations and submitted them for public comment, but it sat on the matter for 6 years. So now, the Executive branch is forcing it to take another look.
You can review the entire history at the Federal Register here: Linear No-Threshold Model and Standards for Protection Against Radiation.
Beyond the Overhaul: Crafting Lasting Predictability in America’s Nuclear Future
The Executive Order’s call for a “wholesale revision” of regulations (Sec 5) and structural NRC changes (Sec 4) aims for future predictability. Yet, such comprehensive and rapid reforms inherently introduce short-term instability.
The challenge will be navigating this period of disruption to genuinely establish a stable, updated, and confidence-inspiring framework for America’s nuclear ambitions.
Conclusion
This Executive Order represents a bold attempt to pivot U.S. nuclear policy from deep caution towards active facilitation, justified by invoking strategic national interests.
It revisits the historical tension between safety and promotion. The success of this ambitious reform hinges on achieving a new, sustainable balance, lest it become another pendulum swing in our nuclear regulatory saga.